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A LITTLE LIGHT ON THE MAYO: A METHOD FOR OVERTURNING THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S 
LATEST ASSOCIATION FOR MOLECULAR PATHOLOGY DECISION 
 
Kevin J. Georgek* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Patents grant their owners the right to exclude others from practicing a claimed invention for 
a limited time.
1
  Whether patents actually protect the economic interests of their owners, provide 
incentive for innovation, and foster economic growth has been extensively debated.
2
  There are 
undisputedly, however, times when the same patents that may protect an entity’s exclusive 
interest in a claimed invention—to an important, lifesaving therapy for instance—simultaneously 
deprive others of access to that very invention resulting in significant harm to those excluded.
3
  
Precedent indicates, and policy dictates, that when awarding a patent could inhibit subsequent 
advances in a given field to the detriment of researchers and patients, a modification to the 
traditional calculus for determining whether subject matter is patent-eligible is warranted.
 4
  This 
modification involves broadening the scope of appropriate considerations to encompass extra-
statutory concerns. 
                                                 
* J.D. Candidate, 2014, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. 
1 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Boomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 549 (1852) (defining a patent as a franchise 
granting “the right to exclude everyone from making, using, or vending the thing patented, without the permission of 
the patentee”).  
2 See Ted Sichelman & Stuart J.H. Graham, Patenting by Entrepreneurs: An Empirical Study, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. 
& TECH. L. REV. 111, 116–17 (2010) (asserting that patents afford inventors—particularly small firms and 
individuals—a degree of insulation from competitors who seek to sell the same invention at a lower price in the 
marketplace and that this protection from competition spurs innovation by enabling inventors to recover 
development costs without fearing that competitors will unduly benefit from their innovative ideas); see also 
Andrew W. Torrance & Bill Tomlinson, Patents and the Regress of Useful Arts, 10 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 
130, 131 (2009) (offering empirical data to debunk the “orthodox assumption that technological innovation can be 
encouraged through the prospect of patent protection”). 
3 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 188–89 (2010), 
rev'd, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (listing parties who face prohibitive costs of obtaining BRCA1 and BRCA2 
genetic testing as a result of their insurance companies’ failure to cover the cost of testing and by their inability to 
pursue alternative testing or obtain second opinions on test results since the patent holder is the only provider of 
testing services in the United States.). 
4 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012). 
2 
 
 The merits of gene patenting and the broader issue of subject matter eligibility generally 
have been at the center of many recent debates.
5
  This Comment seeks to provide an overview of 
subject matter eligibility jurisprudence leading up to the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit’s (hereinafter “Federal Circuit”) latest decision in Association for Molecular Pathology v. 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (hereinafter “Association for Molecular 
Pathology”).6  It also suggests that the Supreme Court—by granting certiorari in this case on the 
question of whether human genes are patentable—has an opportunity to clarify the appropriate 
analysis for determining whether the subject matter at issue in Association for Molecular 
Pathology is patent-eligible.  Part II of this Comment provides a historical perspective into the 
development of modern subject matter eligibility jurisprudence and details the approach the 
Supreme Court adopted in Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc. (hereinafter 
“Mayo”),7 a recent case concerning patent eligibility.  Part III discusses Association for 
Molecular Pathology and details the method for determining patent eligibility that the Federal 
Circuit advanced in that case.  Part IV argues that the Federal Circuit erred in its dismissive 
treatment of the effect of Mayo on Association for Molecular Pathology because neither 
Supreme Court nor Federal Circuit precedent supports the Federal Circuit’s treatment of different 
claim types in isolation.  Accordingly, this section describes three opinions from Supreme Court 
and Federal Circuit precedent which explicitly recognize that concerns raised in the context of 
                                                 
5 See Christopher M. Holman, Will Gene Patents Derail the Next Generation of Genetic Technologies?: A 
Reassessment of the Evidence Suggests Not, 80 UMKC L. REV. 563, (2012); Abigail Lauer, Comment, The 
Disparate Effects of Gene Patents on Different Categories of Scientific Research, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 179, 
(2011); W. Nicholson Price II, Unblocked Future: Why Gene Patents Won’t Hinder Whole Genome Sequencing and 
Personalized Medicine, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1601, (2012). 
6 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012).  Given 
the extensive procedural history of this case, a point of clarification at this juncture is warranted.  Whenever this 
Comment refers to “Association for Molecular Pathology” it is discussing the case cited at the beginning of this 
footnote—the Federal Circuit’s second opinion in the case following remand by the Supreme Court.  
7 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
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one type of patent claim are applicable in the context of  different claim types.
8
  Part IV will also 
discuss the Supreme Court’s repeated disinclination to adhere to rigid tests promulgated by the 
Federal Circuit in favor of more nuanced and holistic analyses—particularly in the areas of 
subject matter eligibility and obviousness.  Part V discusses the Supreme Court’s grant of 
certiorari in Association for Molecular Pathology on the question of whether human genes are 
patentable and predicts that the Court will answer this question in the negative after carefully 
weighing policy considerations when analyzing patent eligibility.  Part VI briefly addresses  
Ultimately, this Comment concludes that the Federal Circuit’s rationale for its dismissive 
treatment of Mayo contravenes Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedent which dictates that 
the reservations the Court expressed in refusing to uphold Mayo’s method claims are applicable 
to the composition claims in Association for Molecular Pathology.  Additionally, important 
policy considerations including the harmful effects of Myriad’s patents on genetic research, test 
quality, and patient access to testing, compel the conclusion that Myriad’s claims to isolated 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 (BRCA1/2) should be rendered ineligible for patent protection.  Finally, the 
Supreme Court’s consistent skepticism of strict tests promulgated by the Federal Circuit, and the 
Supreme Court’s decision to address the broad question of whether human genes are patentable 
on certiorari,
9
 signal that the Court will not limit its analysis of patent eligibility to the text of the 
statute, but rather will weigh important extra-statutory concerns into the subject matter eligibility 
analysis.  
 
 
                                                 
8 See F. SCOTT KIEFF, PAULINE NEWMAN, HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ & HENRY E. SMITH, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 
92–95 (Robert C. Clark et. al. eds., 5th ed. 2011) (noting that patent claims are primarily characterized as one of five 
types including: composition, process (or method), apparatus, product-by-process, or means-plus-function). 
9 See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. 
granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3199 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2012) (No. 12-398). 
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II. PATENT-ELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER 
A.  35 U.S.C. § 101 and Early Cases 
 The U.S. Constitution vests Congress with the power “To promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective . . . Discoveries.”10  Congress, in turn, codified laws governing the award of 
these exclusive rights in Title 35 of the United States Code.
11
  The types of discoveries that are 
entitled to receive this protection are described in 35 U.S.C. § 101 (“section 101”), which reads: 
“[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, 
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”12  While this language has often been 
interpreted broadly,
13
 courts have nonetheless consistently recognized implicit limitations to the 
scope of patentable subject matter, often stating that laws of nature, natural phenomena, and 
abstract ideas are not patentable.
14
   
Nature’s handiwork is not patent-eligible.15  Manifestations of the laws of nature such as 
“the heat of the sun, electricity, [and] the qualities of metals, are part of the storehouse of 
                                                 
10 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
11 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
12 Id. 
13 See infra notes 186 and accompanying text. 
14 Compare Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (awarding a patent for a process of curing synthetic rubber 
which, despite employing a well-known mathematical formula, applied it in a process that when considered as a 
whole is patent-eligible), and Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (upholding the award of a patent 
directed to a live, human-made microorganism capable of breaking down crude oil—a property that no naturally 
occurring bacteria possess), with Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 598 (1978) (holding that a formula for computing 
alarm limits—absent  any disclosure relating to the chemical processes employed, the method for monitoring 
variables, or the means of setting off the alarm—was not patent-eligible), and Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 
(1852) (“A principle . . . is a fundamental truth . . . [which] cannot be patented, as no one can claim in . . . them an 
exclusive right.”). 
15 See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948). 
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knowledge of all men . . . and [are] reserved exclusively to none.”16   Material derived from 
natural sources which is then transformed or reduced into a form that possess characteristics 
markedly different
17
 from those of the material as it exists in nature, however, has long been 
recognized by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) as patent-eligible.
18
  
While the precise boundaries of what constitutes “markedly different” subject matter remain 
unclear, the Federal Circuit defined a “markedly different” molecule as one that has “a distinct[] 
chemical structure and identity” from naturally occurring molecules.19   
While section 101 does not, on its face, declare living matter patent-eligible, the Plant 
Patents Act of 1930—which declared that plants were eligible for patenting if they could be 
reproduced asexually—broadened the scope of patentable subject matter to include a form of 
living matter that had not undergone an extraction or a purification step, but that existed purely 
in its natural form.
20
  The Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970 also recognized that certain forms 
of live plants were eligible for protection but explicitly declared that bacteria were outside the 
scope of the Act.
21
  Bacteria were shortly thereafter determined to be within the scope of patent-
eligible subject matter, provided that they displayed “markedly different characteristics from any 
                                                 
16 Id. at 130. 
17 Although the precise threshold beyond which a composition becomes “markedly different” than any naturally 
existing composition remains elusive, the Federal Circuit illustrated by way of analogy to case law that it lies 
somewhere between non-markedly different combinations of existing molecules and markedly different genetically 
engineered molecules.  See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 
1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 2012).  
18 See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass’n v. United States, 207 U.S. 556, 562 (1908) (stating that in order to 
overcome the bar on patenting  products of nature, an inventor must prove that the product for which he seeks a 
patent has become a new and distinct article with new characteristics or uses); Park-Davis & Co. v. Mulford & Co., 
196 F. 496, 496 (2d Cir. 1912) (holding that patents claiming a derivative of crystalline adrenaline, extracted from 
suprarenal tissue in animals for use as an agent to increase blood pressure, were valid); U.S. Patent #135,245 
(claiming a form of brewer’s yeast “free from organic germs of disease”—despite  the fact that brewer’s yeast 
existed in nature—which could be used to brew beer that was easier to preserve).  
19 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1328 (2012). 
20 Townsend-Purnell Plant Patent Act, Pub. L. No. 245, 46 Stat. 376 (1930) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 
161–64 (2006)).  
21 Plant Variety Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (1930) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 
2321–2583 (2006)) (“The breeder of any sexually or tuber propagated plant variety (other than fungi or bacteria) 
who has so reproduced the variety . . . shall be entitled to plant variety protection for the variety . . . .”). 
6 
 
[bacteria] found in nature.”22  The prohibition on patenting laws of nature, natural phenomenon, 
and abstract ideas standing alone also encompasses methods and processes that include this 
subject matter within their scope.
23
  Such subject matter is only eligible for patenting if, when 
considered as a whole, the patent describes an application of the law of nature, natural 
phenomenon, or abstract idea and does not simply attempt to claim the naturally existing subject 
matter itself.
24
 
Currently, the USPTO characterizes isolated DNA that encodes specific genes as patent-
eligible subject matter.
25
  The USPTO’s Utility Examination Guidelines instruct that “an 
inventor’s discovery of a gene can be the basis for a patent on the genetic composition isolated 
from its natural state and processed through purifying steps that separate the gene from other 
molecules naturally associated with it.”26  While these Guidelines do not have the binding effect 
of law, they nevertheless remain influential in that a reviewing court may defer to the agency’s 
interpretation of a statute it oversees.
27
  Despite their influence, however, the scope of the rights 
the Guidelines confer to a patent holder remains unclear.
28
 
In addition to its reliance on the USPTO’s Utility Examination Guidelines, the Federal 
Circuit—in determining that the isolated DNA at issue in Association for Molecular Pathology 
                                                 
22 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980).  
23 See infra notes 75–86 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 75–86 and accompanying text. 
25 See Eric J. Rogers, Comment, Can You Patent Genes? Yes and No, 93 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 19, 28 
(2010). 
26 U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Dep’t of Commerce, RIN 0651-AB09, UTILITY EXAMINATION GUIDELINES 
(2001). 
27 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1325 (2012); In re 
Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (referring to the Utility Examination Guidelines). 
28 See Peter Edwards, Comment,  AMP v. Myriad: The Future of Medicine and Patent Law, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI. & 
TECH. 811, 818 (2011) (noting the lack of clarity in the language of the Guidelines which provides that while the 
holder of a gene patent has the right to exclude others from using that gene, the patent holder must also promote 
discovery of other uses of the gene by other researchers.  The Guidelines’ lack of clarity is also evident in the 
language which instructs that while genes are patentable, neither the DNA sequences nor the underlying genetic 
information are patentable.  Edwards notes that “it is not clear what the researcher is patenting in a gene, however, if 
not genetic information”). 
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was patent-eligible—acknowledged that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Funk Bros. Seed Co. 
v. Kalo Inoculant Co. and Diamond v. Chakrabarty “set out the primary framework for deciding 
the patent eligibility of compositions of matter, including isolated DNA molecules.”29  As such, a 
detailed discussion of these cases is warranted. 
In 1948, the Supreme Court weighed in on the distinction between patent-eligible subject 
matter and unpatentable products of nature in Funk Bros.
30
  Kalo initiated a lawsuit against Funk 
Bros. alleging that Funk Bros. infringed Kalo’s patent for a bacterial inoculant31 for use with 
leguminous plants.
32
  Prior to the invention, in order to optimize legume growth, farmers were 
required to select the optimal strain of bacteria from a group of at least six species which 
corresponded with their desired legume.
33
  Mixed bacterial cultures largely proved ineffective 
because the bacteria, when mixed, produced inhibitory effects on each other resulting in reduced 
levels of plant growth.
34
  The invention in this case was a mixture of Rhizobium bacteria that did 
not display the commonly observed inhibitory effects of each other on legumes.
35
  The Supreme 
Court acknowledged that the inventor “[did] not create [the] state of inhibition or of non-
inhibition in the bacteria.”36  As justification for the Court’s conclusion that “[the bacteria’s] 
                                                 
29 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1326. .  
30 333 U.S. 127 (1948). 
31 The Court offered the following description of the challenged invention: “An inoculant for leguminous plants 
comprising a plurality of selected mutually non-inhibitive strains of different species of bacteria of the genus 
Rhizobium, said strains being unaffected by each other in respect to their ability to fix nitrogen in the leguminous 
plant for which they are specific.”  Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 127, n.1.  An alternative explanation of the process of 
bacterial inoculation can be found at: 
http://www.ctahr.hawaii.edu/bnf/Downloads/Training/Legume%20use/Title.Pdf (explaining that increasing the 
concentration of Rhizobia, unique bacteria that naturally exists in the soil, can result in the infection of the root hairs 
of legumes.  This infection results in the formation of nitrogen-fixing nodules which act as “small nitrogen 
factories” that produce proteins essential for plant growth.) 
32 See Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 128. 
33 Id. at 129 (explaining that “[n]o one species [of bacteria] will infect the roots of all species of leguminous plants. 
But each [species of bacteria] will infect well-defined groups of those plants . . . . Thus if a farmer had crops of 
clover, alfalfa, and soy beans he would have to use three separate inoculants”). 
34 Id. at 129–30.   
35 Id. at 130. 
36 Id. 
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qualities are the work of nature . . . . [and] [t]hose qualities are of course not patentable,” the 
Court reasoned that “the combination of species produces no new bacteria, no change in the 
species of bacteria, and no enlargement of the range of their utility.”37 The Court further 
characterized the bacteria as “manifestations of laws of nature, free to all men and reserved 
exclusively to none.”38   
The difficult task of discerning an unpatentable product of nature from a patentable 
product of human ingenuity was again before the Court in Chakrabarty.
39
  Ananda Chakrabarty, 
a microbiologist at the General Electric Co., sought to patent a genetically engineered bacterium 
that was capable of breaking down crude oil.
40
  The Court again recognized the limits to 
patentability, stating: 
The laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not 
patentable . . . .  Thus, a new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found in 
the wild is not patentable subject matter.  Likewise, Einstein could not patent his 
celebrated law that E=mc
2
; nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity.
41 
 
Such discoveries are “manifestations of . . . nature, free to all men and reserved 
exclusively to none.”42 
 
In this case, however, the Court ultimately upheld the patent, finding that “the patentee 
has produced a new bacterium with markedly different characteristics from any found in 
nature and one having the potential for significant utility.  His discovery is not nature's 
handiwork, but his own; accordingly it is patentable subject matter under section 101.”43  In 
                                                 
37 Funk Bros., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948). 
38 Id. at 130. 
39 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).  
40 The Court offered the following explanation of the claimed invention: “Plasmids are hereditary units physically 
separate from the chromosomes of the cell.  In prior research, Chakrabarty and an associate discovered that plasmids 
control the oil degradation abilities of certain bacteria.  In particular, the two researchers discovered plasmids 
capable of degrading camphor and octane, two components of crude oil.  In the work represented by the patent 
application at issue here, Chakrabarty discovered a process by which four different plasmids, capable of degrading 
four different oil components, could be transferred to and maintained stably in a single Pseudomonas bacterium, 
which itself has no capacity for degrading oil.”  Id. at 305, n.1. 
41 Id. at 309. 
42 Id. (quoting Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130 (1948)). 
43 Id. at 310. 
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formulating its conclusion, the Court looked in part to the Committee Reports accompanying the 
1952 Patent Act, which it interpreted to instruct that Congress intended patentable subject matter 
to broadly “include anything under the sun that is made by man.”44 
In sum, while the patent in Funk Bros. attempted to claim a mere mixture of naturally 
occurring bacteria, the patent in Chakrabarty was directed to a new bacterium which exhibited 
characteristics not found in nature.  Notably, the Court approached Funk Bros. and Chakrabarty 
in a similar fashion; primarily relying on a comparison between the function of the claimed 
invention with the function of a naturally occurring analogue.   
It is not immediately apparent where Myriad’s isolated DNA fits along the spectrum 
delineated by Funk Bros. and Chakrabarty.  Whether the isolated DNA at issue has a “distinct 
chemical structure and identity” and meets the Federal Circuit’s definition of “markedly 
different” is open to debate.  However, determining whether isolated BRCA1/2 DNA surpasses 
illusive “markedly different” threshold is not determinative of patent eligibility.  The Supreme 
Court—in reviewing the issues presented in Association for Molecular Pathology on certiorari 
and ultimately vacating the Federal Circuit’s ruling—declined to confine its analysis to the cases 
offered by the Federal Circuit.
45
  Instead, on remand, the Court advised that the Federal Circuit 
consider the issues in Association for Molecular Pathology in light of its recent decision in Mayo 
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.
46—a case that recognized a more 
nuanced set of criteria for determining patent eligibility than the test advanced in Funk Bros. and 
Chakrabarty.
47
 
 
                                                 
44 Id. at 309 (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)); see infra note 180 and 
accompanying text. 
45 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012). 
46 See id.  
47 See infra notes 99–103 and accompanying text. 
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B. Subject Matter Eligibility in Mayo 
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. develops products that enable physicians to detect, 
diagnose, and treat disorders in the fields of gastroenterology and oncology.
48
  It also specializes 
in personalized medicine—a method of using an individual’s unique serologic, genetic, and 
inflammation markers to diagnose certain disorders and predict treatment outcomes.
49
  The 
Prometheus patents at issue in this case were directed to a method for administering thiopurine 
drugs,
50
 one that sought to maximize the efficacy of the drugs for each individual patient by 
accounting for individuals’ different rates of metabolizing thiopurines.51  The following claim in 
the Prometheus patent describes the invention and is one of the claims at issue: 
A method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy for treatment of an immune-mediated 
gastrointestinal disorder, comprising: (a) administering a drug providing 6-
thioguanine to a subject having said immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder; and 
(b) determining the level of 6-thioguanine in said subject having said immune-
mediated gastrointestinal disorder, wherein the level of 6-thioguanine less than 
about 230 pmol per 8x10
8
 red blood cells indicates a need to increase the amount of 
said drug subsequently administered to said subject and wherein the level of 6-
thioguanine greater than about 400 pmol per 8x10
8
 red blood cells indicates a 
need to decrease the amount of said drug subsequently administered to said 
subject.
52
 
 
Prometheus initiated an infringement lawsuit when Mayo Medical Laboratories (Mayo) 
announced that it planned to introduce its own test—one which used slightly higher thiopurine 
                                                 
48 See About Prometheus, PROMETHEUSLABS.COM, http://www.prometheuslabs.com/About.asp (last visited Oct. 25, 
2012). 
49 See Diagnostics, PROMETHEUSPATIENTS.COM, http://www.prometheuspatients.com/Products_Diagnostics.asp (last 
visited Oct. 25, 2012). 
50 Thiopurines are a class of synthetic drugs used to treat immune mediated gastro-intestinal disorders including 
Crohn’s disease and ulcerative colitis.  See Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 
1339 (Fed. Cir. 2009), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 3543 (2010) (“Prometheus III”). 
51 See id.  
52 U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 (filed Apr. 8, 1999); see infra notes 78–80 and accompanying text. 
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metabolite levels to measure toxicity—to the marketplace.53  Mayo moved for summary 
judgment, alleging that the Prometheus patents were invalid because they impermissibly claimed 
the “correlation between the recited metabolite levels and therapeutic efficacy and/or toxicity,” 
which it alleged was an unpatentable “natural, observable phenomenon” and that “the patents 
impermissibly preempt use of the correlation.” 54  Thus, Mayo alleged that the Prometheus 
patents did not preclude them from marketing their test.
55
 
The district court granted Mayo’s motion, finding that Prometheus’s claims reciting 
correlations between thiopurine drug metabolite levels and therapeutic efficacy or toxicity were 
directed to natural phenomena.
56
  On appeal, the Federal Circuit—relying on the machine-or-
transformation (M or T) test
57—reversed the district court’s decision.58  As understood by the 
Federal Circuit, the M or T test provided that, “a claimed process is surely patent-eligible under 
section 101 if: (1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular 
article into a different state or thing.”59  The Federal Circuit ultimately concluded that 
Prometheus’s method claims satisfied the M or T test and thus, were patent-eligible.60   
In arriving at this conclusion, the Federal Circuit determined that the Prometheus patents fell 
within the scope of section 101 because both the “administering” and “determining” steps 
“‘transform an article into a different state or thing’ and this transformation ‘is central to the 
purpose of the claimed process.’”61  Regarding the “administering” step, the Federal Circuit 
                                                 
53 Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., No. 04CV1200, 2008 WL 878910, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 
2008), rev'd, 581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“Prometheus II”). 
54 Id. at *5 (quoting Doc. No. 502 at 11, 13). 
55 See id. 
56 See id. at *6, *14. 
57 See infra note 59 and accompanying text. 
58 See Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  
59 Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed.Cir. 2009), rev'd, 135 S. Ct. 3543 
(2010) (Prometheus III) (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 953 (Fed. Cir. 2008), rev'd, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010)). 
60 See id. at 1350. 
61 Id. at 1345 (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). 
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recognized that “the human body necessarily undergoes a transformation [when drugs are 
administered]” and dismissed “the fact that the change of the administered drug to its metabolite 
relies on natural process” as dispositive of patent ineligibility.62  The court characterized the 
transformation in this case as “the result of the physical administration of a drug to a subject to 
transform—i.e., treat—the subject, which is itself not a natural process.”63  The Federal Circuit 
also found the “determining” step of Prometheus’s claimed method to be “transformative and 
central.”64  The court stated that “[d]etermining the levels of [a drug] in a subject necessarily 
involves a transformation, for those levels cannot be determined by mere inspection.”65  Rather, 
this determination requires a certain amount of manipulation in the form of extracting the 
metabolites from the human body and determining their concentration.
66
  The Federal Circuit 
dismissed Mayo’s additional argument that the Prometheus patents preempted a natural 
phenomenon by stating that “because the claims meet the machine-or-transformation test, they 
do not preempt a fundamental principle.”67  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that 
Prometheus’s claims were properly directed to patent-eligible subject matter.  
The Supreme Court, having re-visited the question of subject matter eligibility in its 
Bilski v. Kappos decision, which it handed down the day before, granted certiorari in the Mayo 
case, vacated the Federal Circuit’s judgment, and remanded the case to the Federal Circuit for 
further consideration in light of Bilski.
68
  In its Bilski decision, the Supreme Court addressed the 
patent eligibility of business methods.
69
  The claims at issue were directed to a method of risk 
hedging in commodities markets which included the steps of initiating a series of transactions 
                                                 
62 Id. at 1346.  
63 Id.  
64 Id. at 1347. 
65 Prometheus Labs., Inc., 581 F.3d at 1347. 
66 See Prometheus, 581 F.3d at 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  
67 Id. at 1349. 
68 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 130 S. Ct. 3543 (2010).  
69 See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
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between commodity providers and consumers who had a certain risk position, identifying market 
participants for the commodity who had a corresponding counter-risk position, and initiating a 
series of transactions between the commodity providers and market participants.
70
  The Court 
ultimately determined that the claims were drawn towards the concept of hedging risk—an 
unpatentable, abstract idea.
71
  Notably, the Court also held that the M or T test is not the sole test 
for patent eligibility under section 101, but rather is a “useful and important clue, an 
investigative tool” for determining patent eligibility.72  On remand, the Federal Circuit applied 
largely the same analysis that it did in its first Mayo decision, again holding that the claims 
recited patent-eligible subject matter under section 101
73
 and again relying on the M or T test to 
reach that conclusion.
74
  
 On March 20, 2012, a unanimous Supreme Court, having granted certiorari, reversed the 
Federal Circuit’s decision and held that Prometheus’s claims were not properly drawn to patent-
eligible subject matter under section 101.
75
  Rather, the Court determined the patents effectively 
claimed ineligible laws of nature that described the relationships between levels of thiopurine 
metabolites and therapeutic efficacy or toxicity.
76
  In arriving at this conclusion, the Court 
questioned whether “the patent claims add enough to their statement of the correlations to allow 
the processes they describe to qualify as patent-eligible processes that apply natural laws.”77  The 
Court, turning first to the administering step, stated that it “simply refer[ed] to the relevant 
                                                 
70 See id. at 3223–24. 
71 See id. at 3231. 
72 Id. at 3227. 
73 See Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2010), rev'd, No. 10-
1150, slip op. (U.S. Mar. 20, 2012) (Prometheus IV). 
74 See id. at 1355 (stating that Prometheus’s claimed methods “satisfy the transformation prong” of the M or T test).  
75 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).  
76 See id. at 1305.  
77 Id. at 1297.  
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audience” namely, doctors who are familiar with using thiopurines to treat patients.78  The Court 
noted that merely limiting the use of an abstract idea to a predefined technological environment 
is not enough to circumvent the prohibition against patenting abstract ideas.
79
  Turning to the 
wherein clauses in the Prometheus patent on page ten supra, the Court dismissed the possibility 
that they could change an unpatentable concept into a patentable application by summarily 
stating that they “simply tell a doctor about the relevant natural laws . . . .”80  Finally, the Court 
understood the determining step to instruct the doctor to “engage in well-understood, routine, 
conventional activity.”81  The Court ultimately determined that neither the administering, 
determining, nor wherein limitations standing alone or in combination “[were] sufficient to 
transform unpatentable natural correlations into patentable applications of those regularities.”82 
The Court suggested additional justifications for its conclusion that Prometheus’s patents 
were drawn to ineligible subject matter from two cases dealing with the patent eligibility of 
processes using mathematical formulas which, like laws of nature, are not patentable standing 
alone.
83
  First, the Court stated that Prometheus’s claims “present[] a case for patentability that is 
weaker than Diehr’s patent-eligible claim and no stronger than Flook’s unpatentable one.”84  
While Diehr and Flook have proven difficult to reconcile,
85
 developing a complete 
                                                 
78 Id. 
79 See id. at 1291 (citing In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). 
80 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1291 (2012). 
81 Id. at 1298 (stating that this “activity” involves determining levels of thiopurine metabolites, but does not restrict 
the method  researchers did not know of the precise correlation between thiopurine metabolite levels and the 
efficacy or toxicity of the drugs, they knew of the relationship). 
82 See id. 
83 See Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1292.  
84 Id. 
85 See Horacio E. Gutiérrez, Peering Through the Cloud: The Future of Intellectual Property and Computing, 
20 FED. CIR. B.J. 589 (2011) (noting that Diehr and Flook had “very similar facts” with opposite results); Mark A. 
Lemley, Point of Novelty, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1253 (2011) (noting that the claims in Diehr and Flook are “exactly 
parallel”); Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other 
Computer Program Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1104 (“[P]ost-Benson case law is replete with 
awkward distinctions and results that are often difficult to reconcile.”). 
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understanding of the Court’s rationale for its holding in Mayo requires a closer examination of 
these cases.  
In Parker v. Flook, the Court considered the validity of a patent directed to a method for 
updating alarm limits for a catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons in which the only 
point of novelty over prior, well known methods for changing alarm limits
86
 was the inventor’s 
employment of a mathematical formula.
87
  The entire process consisted of essentially three steps 
including “an initial step which merely measures the present value of the process variable (e.g., 
the temperature); an intermediate step which uses an algorithm to calculate an updated alarm-
limit value; and a final step in which the actual alarm limit is adjusted to the updated value.”88  
The Court noted that the plain language of section 101 does not instruct on whether the claimed 
method—characterized only by the novel use of a mathematical formula—was patent-eligible 
subject matter.
89
  It also acknowledged that “[t]he line between a patentable process and an 
unpatentable principle is not always clear.”90  The Court stated that because mathematical 
formulas are not eligible for patenting by themselves,
91
 the question in this case was whether 
“post–solution applications of . . . a formula makes [a] method eligible for patent protection.”92  
Ultimately, the Court answered its own question in the negative, characterizing the claimed 
process as accomplishing nothing more than “provid[ing] a[n unpatentable] formula for 
computing an updated alarm limit.”93 
                                                 
86 See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978) (offering an explanation of an alarm limit as a predetermined 
number  that, when exceeded by certain process variables such as pressure and temperature during the process of 
catalytic conversion, signals either irregularities in the process or the presence of potential dangers). 
87 See id. at 586–87.  
88 Id. at 585. 
89 Id. at 588. 
90 Id. at 589 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
91 Id. at 585 (“In Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 93 S. Ct. 253, 34 L.Ed.2d 273, we held that the discovery of a 
novel and useful mathematical formula may not be patented.”). 
92 Id. (emphasis added). 
93 Parker, 437 U.S. at 586.  
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Three years after the Court decided Flook, it was again tasked with determining the 
patent eligibility of a process which employed a mathematical equation.
94
  The claimed process 
was a method for curing rubber which involved instruments that continuously monitored the 
temperature inside a mold cavity, transmitted the information to a digital computer which 
employed the Arrhenius equation
95
 and made continuous adjustments to the cure time, and sent 
signals to open the mold at the appropriate time.
96
  Unlike in Flook, the Diehr patent did not 
attempt to claim a well-known equation itself, nor did it seek to preempt further use of that 
equation.  Rather, the applicants sought only “to foreclose from others the use of that equation in 
conjunction with all of the other steps in their claimed process.”97  The Court held that the 
claimed process was patent-eligible, stating that it did “not view [the] claims as an attempt to 
patent a mathematical formula, but rather to [claim] an industrial process for the molding of 
rubber products . . . .”98  In sum, the Court stated that its opinions in Flook and Diehr were 
consistent with the Court’s general position that “simply appending conventional steps, specified 
at a high level of generality, to laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas cannot 
make those laws, phenomena, and ideas patentable.”99  
As a final justification for its holding in Mayo, the Court recognized that its subject 
matter eligibility jurisprudence has “repeatedly emphasized . . . a concern that patent law not 
                                                 
94 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
95 Id. at 177 n.2 (indicating that the Arrhenius equation can be expressed as ln v = CZ + x where ln v is the natural 
log of the total required cure time, v; C is the activation constant, Z is the temperature in the mold, and x is a 
constant dependent on the geometry of the mold in the press).  
96 Id. at 177–79. 
97 Id. at 187. 
98 Id. at 192–93. 
99 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1300  (2012) (citing O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 
U.S. 62 (1853); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64, 65, 67, 93 (1972); and Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 
3230 (2010) in support of the Court’s general view that appending conventional steps to laws of nature does not 
make those ideas patent-eligible). 
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inhibit further discovery by improperly tying up the future use of laws of nature and the like.”100  
The Court was concerned that “because [natural] laws and principles are ‘the basic tools of 
scientific and technological work,’ there is a danger that granting patents that tie up their use will 
inhibit future innovation . . . .”101  Prometheus’s claims implicated this concern because “telling a 
doctor to measure metabolite levels and to consider the resulting measurements in light of the 
correlations they describe . . . tie[s] up his subsequent treatment decision regardless of whether 
he changes his dosage in the light of the inference he draws using the correlations.”102  The Court 
clearly expressed a concern that declaring Prometheus’s claims eligible for patenting would 
impede the development of subsequent treatment methods that combine Prometheus’s claimed 
correlations with other discoveries.
103
  Therefore, importantly, the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Mayo is founded on considerations external to the minimal requirements enumerated in section 
101.  Mayo provides that courts seeking to make a determination regarding patent eligibility 
should not only consider the invention in light of section101 and cases that have interpreted the 
statute, but they should also engage in a separate analysis whereby they weigh considerations of 
the harm that could stem from tying up the use of natural laws and inhibiting discovery in a field 
into the calculus for determining whether certain subject matter is patent-eligible.  
III.   ASSOCIATION FOR MOLECULAR PATHOLOGY AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S INTERPRETATION OF 
MAYO 
 Mayo has already proven impactful—and likely stands to play an even greater role in the 
near future—as courts struggle to develop consistent standards in the subject matter eligibility 
                                                 
100 See Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1301.  
101 Id. at 1292 (quoting Gottshalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). 
102 Id. at 1292. 
103 See id. at 1292. 
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arena.  Its influence was felt, although minimally, in Association for Molecular Pathology—a 
highly publicized
104
 case and the latest chapter in the gene patent debate.   
In the mid-1990s, researchers confirmed that mutations in the BRCA1/2 genes
105
 
correlated with an increased risk of developing breast and ovarian cancer.
106
  Women who inherit 
these genetic mutations face up to an eighty five percent risk of breast cancer—the second 
leading cause of cancer related death among women in the United States—and up to a fifty 
percent risk of ovarian cancer.
107
  BRCA1 mutations have also been linked with cancers of the 
cervix, uterus, pancreas, and colon while BRCA2 mutations have been observed to increase the 
risk of developing pancreatic and stomach cancer as well as melanoma.
108
  Male carriers of the 
BRCA1/2 mutation face an increased risk of breast and prostate cancer.
109
  Determining the 
existence of BRCA1/2 mutations is a critically important diagnostic and preventative tool.
110
  
Aside from the benefits that stem from an individual’s ability to make informed decisions 
relating to aspects of their life ranging from daily activities to family planning, knowledge of 
BRCA1/2 mutations enables doctors to tailor the most effective treatment regimens for each 
individual patient—selecting from minimally intrusive options such as increased surveillance 
and monitoring, to more aggressive forms of treatment like chemotherapy.
111
 
                                                 
104 See, e.g., Brent Kendall, Court Rules Biotech Firm Can Patent Human Genes, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 16, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443324404577593251249665074.html; Jonathan Stempel, Myriad 
Wins Gene Patent Ruling from US Appeals Court, REUTERS,  Aug. 16, 2012,  available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/16/us-myriad-patent-idUSBRE87F12K20120816.  
105 See BRCA1 and BRCA2: Cancer Risk and Genetic Testing, NAT’L CANCER INST., 
http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/BRCA#r5 (last updated May 29, 2009) (stating that the names 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 stand for breast cancer susceptibility gene 1 and 2, respectively and explaining that tumor 
suppressor genes normally function to maintain the stability of a cell’s genetic material (DNA) and help to prevent 
uncontrolled cell growth). 
106 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010). 
107 Id.  
108 BRCA1 and BRCA2: Cancer Risk and Genetic Testing, supra note 104.  
109 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d. at 203. 
110 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
111 Id.  
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 In September 1994, Myriad Genetics, Inc. (Myriad)—based on its work in conjunction 
with researchers at the National Institute for Environmental Health Sciences, the University of 
Utah, McGill University, and Eli Lilly Co.—sequenced the BRCA1 gene and sought to patent 
it.
112
  By the end of 1995, Myriad filed for patents on the BRCA2 gene following its work with 
scientists in Canada and at the University of Pennsylvania.
113
  As the sole licensee
114
 of the 
patents related to the BRCA1/2 genes, Myriad controls all research and testing on or associated 
with the genes
115
 and, as the benefactor of a limited monopoly, charges inflated prices for the 
test.
116
  In addition, Myriad has aggressively prohibited other labs from performing its patented 
test
117
 and generally refuses to grant licenses for second opinion diagnostic testing.
118
  Studies 
indicate that this exclusivity impedes research and hinders the development of improvements to 
testing.
119
   
 Myriad’s seven patents contained a total of fifteen composition and method claims.120  
The composition claims are directed to three different types of isolated DNA molecules 
                                                 
112 Id. at 202. 
113 Id.  
114 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(stating that the University of Utah is the owner of the patents in suit).  
115 See ACLU, http://www.aclu.org/free-speech/brca-faqs (last visited Apr. 23, 2013). 
116 See Genetic Testing Facilities and Cost, BREASTCANCER.ORG, 
http://www.breastcancer.org/symptoms/testing/genetic/facility_cost (last visited Nov. 9, 2012). 
117 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 205 (referring to cease and desist letters concerning 
BRAC1/2 genetic testing sent to Dr. Kazazian, the University of Pennsylvania, and the director of the Yale DNA 
Diagnostics Lab). 
118 Kevin E. Noonan, USPTO Holds First Hearing on “Second Opinion” Genetic Testing, PATENT DOCS (Feb. 16, 
2012), http://www.patentdocs.org/2012/02/uspto-holds-hearing-on-second-opinion-genetic-testing.html (reporting 
on the status of two planned hearings aimed at implementing a provision of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act 
requiring the USPTO to study the advisability of permitting “second opinions” for patented genetic diagnostic tests 
without patent infringement liability stating that Myriad generally prevented other testing labs from performing its 
patented test). 
119 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d. at 206–07; Olga Bogard, Patenting the Human Body: The 
Constitutionality of Gene Patents and Suggested Remedies for Reform, 63 SMU L. REV. 1319, 1326 (2010) (stating 
that Myriad took an “unprecedented [path] in the field of genetic testing” by departing from the general practice of 
willingly granting licenses to labs to improve access to diagnostic testing and second opinions, and to encourage 
price reductions and acceptance among insurance carriers, by strictly enforcing their rights to exclude others from 
using their invention). 
120 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 211.  
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including: (1) isolated DNA sequences—identical to naturally occurring sequences—
encompassing the full length gene sequence; (2) shorter isolated sequences of DNA—measuring 
as short as fifteen nucleotides; and (3) cDNA molecules which are distinct from the naturally 
occurring sequences in that their non-coding segments have been removed and they are 
complimentary to naturally occurring DNA.
121
  Claims 1 and 5 in Patent 5,747,282 are 
representative of the composition claims at issue in this case and recite: “1. An isolated DNA 
coding for a BRCA1 polypeptide, said polypeptide having the amino acid sequence set forth in 
SEQ ID NO: 2 . . . 5. An isolated DNA having at least 15 nucleotides of the DNA of claim 1 . . . 
.”122  Isolated DNA is often an essential element in many procedures to diagnose diseases and 
detect genetic disorders.
123
  
 In response to the restrictive licensing and high costs of obtaining BRCA1/2 tests, The 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), The Association for Molecular Pathology, several non-
profit women’s organizations, research scientists, and individuals initiated a lawsuit in 2010 
challenging the validity of Myriad’s patents in the Southern District of New York.124  In a 
departure from what was the common practice of upholding gene patents, Judge Sweet—
emphasizing the similarity between the function of isolated genes and native DNA as carriers of 
information
125—determined that Myriad’s composition and method claims impermissibly sought 
to patent ineligible products of nature under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
126
  Judge Sweet, in an effort to 
differentiate isolated DNA from other chemical compounds that were the subjects of previous 
                                                 
121 See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2011).  
122 U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 (filed June 7, 1995).  
123 See George Rice, DNA Extraction, http://serc.carleton.edu/microbelife/research_methods/genomics/dnaext.html 
124 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
125 See id. at 228. 
126 See id. at 238. 
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patents,
127
 pointed to the dual nature of DNA—acknowledging that it is both a chemical 
compound, but also a physical carrier of genetic information.
128
  Judge Sweet further declared 
that Myriad’s diagnostic method claims were invalid because they claimed a comparison—an 
unpatentable mental process—of genetic sequences to determine if differences existed.129 
 Myriad appealed to the Federal Circuit, which issued its first ruling in the case on July 
29, 2011.
130
  Judge Lourie, in his majority opinion, looked to the framework for determining 
patent eligibility set out in Funk Bros. and Chakrabarthy, which asked whether the subject 
matter at issue was “markedly different”131 from that which exists in nature.132  Judge Lourie—
concluding that Myriad’s isolated DNA met this minimum standard and were patent-eligible—
pointed to the unique chemical structure of isolated DNA.
133
  He indicated that Judge Sweet 
erred in determining patent eligibility based on a comparison of the function of isolated and 
genomic DNA and instead urged that isolated DNA be considered a distinct chemical entity.
134
  
Judge Lourie also cautioned against departing from the USPTO’s current practice of awarding 
gene patents and advised that such a dramatic change in policy be initiated by the legislature and 
not the courts.
135
 
                                                 
127 See Park-Davis & Co. v. Mulford & Co., 196 F. 496, 496 (2d Cir. 1912), supra note 18 (noting that chemical 
substances, like crystalline adrenaline, were patent-eligible). 
128 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 228. 
129 See id. at 233–37. 
130 See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
131 Id. at 1351 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980)). 
132 See id. at 1351. 
133 See id. (contrasting isolated DNA with native DNA explaining that “[n]ative DNA exists in the body as one of 
forty-six large, contiguous DNA molecules.  Each DNA molecule is itself an integral part of a larger structural 
complex, a chromosome.  In each chromosome, the DNA molecule is packaged around histone proteins into a 
structure called chromatin, which in turn is packaged into the chromosomal structure . . . .  Isolated DNA, in 
contrast, is a free-standing portion of a native DNA molecule, frequently a single gene.  Isolated DNA has been 
cleaved (i.e., had covalent bonds in its backbone chemically severed) or synthesized to consist of just a fraction of a 
naturally occurring DNA molecule”). 
134 See id. at 1353. 
135 See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1354–55. 
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 In his concurring opinion, Judge Moore indicated that the difference in chemical structure 
between isolated DNA and genomic DNA was not enough, by itself, to render isolated DNA 
“markedly different” from genomic DNA and thus patentable per se.136  Rather, Judge Moore 
engaged in a more searching inquiry, asking “whether these differences impart a new utility 
which makes [isolated DNA] markedly different from nature.”137  He concluded that shorter 
isolated DNA segments were clearly patent-eligible given they are particularly well-suited to 
accomplish a number of tasks that genomic DNA could not accomplish.
138
  Judge Moore 
conceded that larger isolated DNA fragments presented a more difficult question of patent 
eligibility
139
 given that although they have the same chemical characteristics as shorter isolated 
fragments, they do not retain the same utility.
140
  Nonetheless, Judge Moore concluded that 
because Congress has generally “authorized an expansive scope of patentable subject matter,” 
and the USPTO has allowed patents on isolated DNA for decades, these settled expectations of 
patent law “tip[ped] the scale in favor of patentability.”141    
 Judge Bryson’s dissent maintained that Myriad’s composition claims were categorically 
directed to unpatentable subject matter.
142
  In an approach similar to the one adopted by Judge 
Sweet in his district court opinion, Judge Bryson’s holding was based on an understanding that 
the chemical differences between isolated and genomic DNA were of secondary importance to 
                                                 
136 See id. at 1364–65 (Moore, J., concurring in part). 
137 Id. at 1365.  
138 See id. at 1365 (explaining that while “[smaller isolated DNA] sequences can be used as primers in a diagnostic 
screening process to detect gene mutations . . . and as the basis for probes . . . .  Naturally occurring DNA cannot be 
used to accomplish these same goals”).   
139 See id. at 1366 (defining “longer strand” as a piece of isolated DNA containing “most or all of the entire gene” 
and stating that “[l]onger strands of isolated DNA, in particular isolated strands which include most or all of the 
entire gene, are a much closer case.”). 
140 See id. (noting that longer isolated segments are unsuitable as primers which are typically only 100–1,000 bases 
in length). 
141 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1367. 
142 See id. at 1373. 
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the actual function of isolated and genomic DNA—which both operate to transfer information.143  
Judge Bryson rebutted the majority’s reliance on USPTO precedent by pointing out that the 
USPTO’s guidelines are not entitled to significant weight, as indicated by the Supreme Court’s 
refusal to adhere to the guidelines—which stated that microorganisms were not patent-eligible—
at the time they decided Chakrabarty and given that the Department of Justice—which speaks 
for the executive branch, to which the USPTO belongs—filed a brief taking the position that 
Myriad’s composition claims were not eligible for patenting.144  Judge Bryson further raised 
policy arguments in support of his determination that isolated DNA should not be patent-
eligible—including concerns about the preemptive force of Myriad’s broad claims on “the next 
generation of innovation in genetic medicine . . . .”145   
 The Federal Circuit’s decision to uphold Myriad’s composition claims directed to 
isolated human DNA marked a victory not only for Myriad, but also for the entire biotechnology 
industry.  Following the court’s decision, the ACLU petitioned the Federal Circuit to review the 
decision, arguing that the court “erred in failing to consider whether the DNA fragments claimed 
in these patents are products of nature.”146  When the Federal Circuit declined to accept the 
petition for a rehearing, the ACLU filed a petition for writ of certiorari.
147
  Less than a week after 
its decision in Mayo was announced, the Supreme Court granted the pending petition for a writ 
                                                 
143 See id. at 1378. 
144 See id. at 1380–81; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Ass'n for Molecular 
Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (No. 2010-1406), (2010 WL 
4853320, at *10) (“[I]solated but otherwise unaltered genomic DNA is not patent-eligible subject matter under 35 
U.S.C. § 101.”). 
145 Id. at 1380. 
146 Plaintiffs-Appellees’ Petition for Panel Rehearing at 1, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (No. 2010-1406), 2011 WL 5057016, at *1.  
147 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics Inc., No. 11-725, 2011 WL 
6257250 (Dec. 7, 2011). 
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of certiorari.
148
  The Court vacated the Federal Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case to that 
court for “further consideration in light of [Mayo].”149   
 Although the Federal Circuit’s second Association for Molecular Pathology decision 
purports to evaluate the effect of Mayo on the patent eligibility of the isolated DNA at issue in 
Association for Moleculabr Pathology,
150
 in fact, the Federal Circuit rather glancingly 
acknowledged the Supreme Court’s Mayo decision.  Ultimately, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed 
its holding that “the composition claims covering isolated DNA sequences associated with 
predisposition to breast and ovarian cancers were directed to patent-eligible subject matter.”151 
IV.   THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT FAILED TO INCORPORATE MAYO INTO ASSOCIATION FOR MOLECULAR 
PATHOLOGY 
 
 The Federal Circuit’s primary rationale for its dismissive treatment of Mayo in evaluating 
the patent eligibility of Myriad’s composition claims on remand was summed up by the court as 
follows: “[t]he principal claims of the patents before us on remand relate to isolated DNA 
molecules.  Mayo does not control the question of patent-eligibility of such claims.”152  In other 
words, the Federal Circuit largely disregarded Mayo because Mayo dealt with the patent 
eligibility of method claims while the claims at issue in Association for Molecular Pathology 
were directed to compositions of matter.  Notably, as discussed infra, neither Supreme Court nor 
Federal Circuit precedent supports the Federal Circuit’s treatment of different types of claims as 
each having their own distinct set of concerns.  In fact, the Court has indicated that, in the 
process of determining whether certain categories of claims are eligible for patenting, it is 
appropriate to draw upon concerns raised in dealing with one category of claim and consider 
                                                 
148 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012). 
149 Id. 
150 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(“Our decision on remand . . . both decides the issues that were before us in the original appeal and evaluates the 
effect of Mayo on those issues.”). 
151 Id.  
152 Id. at 1325. 
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their applicability in the context of another type of claim.  The Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Gottschalk v. Benson and Bilski v. Kappos are illustrative of the Court’s practice of applying 
concerns across claim types.
153
  
 The claimed invention in Benson was a “method for converting binary coded decimal 
(BCD) numerals into pure binary numerals.”154  The claims professed to cover any use of the 
method in any apparatus or machine of any type.
155
  While the claims were initially rejected by 
the USPTO—and then by the Board of Patent Appeals—they were upheld by the Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals.
156
  The Acting Commissioner of Patents then obtained certiorari.
157
  
In arriving at the conclusion that a computer program—without substantial practical application 
except in association with a computer—was not a patentable process, the Court repeated its 
frequently expressed concern that “phenomena of nature . . . mental processes, and abstract 
intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological 
work.”158  The Court cautioned that “[upholding] the patent would wholly preempt the 
mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself.”159  The 
Court went on to quote its Funk Bros. decision stating, “[h]e who discovers a hitherto unknown 
phenomenon of nature has no claim to a monopoly of it which the law recognizes.”160  The Court 
continued, stating, “[w]e dealt [in Funk Bros.] with a product claim, while the present case deals 
with a process claim.  But we think the same principle applies.”161  
                                                 
153 See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).  
154 Id. at 64. 
155 See id.  
156 Application of Benson, 441 F.2d 682 (1971).  
157 See Benson, 409 U.S. at 63.  
158 Id. at 67.  
159 Id. at 72. 
160 Id. (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)). 
161 Id. at 67–68.  
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The Court’s reasoning regarding the preemptive effect on the mathematical formula that 
would result from upholding the patent in Benson is analogous to the preemptive effect on the 
genetic code that would result from upholding Myriad’s composition claims.  In the same way 
that upholding the patent on the mathematical formula in Benson—which “ha[d] no substantial 
practical application except in connection with a digital computer”—would have wholly 
preempted the use of the mathematical formula, upholding Myriad’s composition claims directed 
to genes—the only physical embodiments of the genetic code—would effectively preempt the 
use of the genetic code.
162
  Thus, Benson can be read to caution against upholding patents that  
would have broad preemptive effects in a field by allowing courts to impute concerns previously 
attributable only to a certain type of claim and to consider them in the context of different claim 
types.  
 Bilski, like Benson, illustrates the notion that concerns raised in the context of one type 
of claim are applicable to other claim types.  In attempting to clarify the plurality opinion, Justice 
Stevens’s concurrence highlighted a number of perceived deficiencies in the Court’s analysis of 
subject matter eligibility.
163
  Stevens placed the plurality’s suggestion that “the [subject matter 
eligibility] analysis turns on the category of patent involved” among those deficiencies.164  
Stevens, instead, maintained that “we have never in the past suggested that the [patent eligible 
subject matter] inquiry varies by subject matter.”165   
Finally—despite its departure from this concept in its Association for Molecular 
Pathology opinion on remand—even the Federal Circuit has explicitly recognized that the scope 
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163 See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3234–36 (2010) (Stevens, J. concurring). 
164 Id. at 3236. 
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of a 35 U.S.C. § 101 analysis should not be limited by the claim type.
166
  In AT&T Corp. v. Excel 
Communications, Inc., the court stated that “we consider the scope of § 101 to be the same 
regardless of the form—machine or process—in which a particular claim is drafted.”167  The 
court acknowledged that “the Supreme Court’s decisions in Diehr, Benson, and Flook all of 
which involved method (i.e., process) claims, have provided and supported the principles which 
we apply to both machine-and process- type claims.”168  The Federal Circuit went on to apply its 
reasoning from two cases dealing with composition claims to the method claims at issue in the 
case before it.
169
 
Therefore, Benson, Bilski, and AT&T can be read to contravene the Federal Circuit’s 
primary rationale for its dismissive treatment of Mayo—that Mayo dealt with method claims 
while Association for Molecular Pathology deals with composition claims.  These cases provide 
clear examples of instances where courts recognized the universal applicability of the concerns 
raised in the context of one type of claim and considered the implications of those concerns in 
the context of another type of claim.  Instead of recognizing that the concerns the Court raised in 
Mayo in the context of method claims were applicable to composition claims, the Federal Circuit 
ignored this instruction from precedent and chose to consider different claim types in isolation.  
 In arriving at its conclusion that Myriad’s isolated DNA molecules were patent-eligible, 
the Federal Circuit also erred in confining its analysis to Funk Bros. and Chakrabarty
170—from 
which the court gleaned the “markedly different” test for determining the patent eligibility of 
                                                 
166 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
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compositions of matter.
171
  This error becomes apparent upon considering the Supreme Court’s 
repeated disinclination to adhere to rigid tests developed by the Federal Circuit in favor of more 
nuanced and holistic analyses.  The dynamic between the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit 
in two cases is indicative of the common approach employed by the Court when faced with a 
decision of whether or not to adhere to a mechanical test proffered by the Federal Circuit.   
For instance, as discussed earlier, the Court chose not to adopt the Federal Circuit’s 
exclusive application of the M or T test to determine whether the subject matter at issue in 
Prometheus’s patents was eligible for patenting.172  KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc. is also 
representative of the Court’s practice of declining to adhere to the rigid tests for deciding issues 
of patentablity as applied by the Federal Circuit.
173
  Although the issue presented in KSR 
concerned whether the claimed invention was obvious—another obstacle to patentability—the 
Federal Circuit has explicitly weighed considerations from the obviousness context into the 
calculus for determining  patent eligiblity under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
174
  In KSR, the Supreme Court 
held that the Federal Circuit’s application of the teaching, suggestion, or motivation (TSM) test 
for obviousness was overly rigid, and the Court urged that any approach to deciding issues of 
obviousness be flexible.
175
  As applied by the Federal Circuit, the TSM test was the principal 
mechanism for determining whether a claimed invention was obvious by looking for a teaching, 
suggestion, or motivation to combine certain existing inventions in a manner that yielded the 
                                                 
171 See Chakrabarty supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
172 See sources cited supra notes 57–103 and accompanying text. 
173 See KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).  
174 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
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claimed invention.
176
  If such a teaching, suggestion, or motivation was found, the invention 
would be obvious.
177
 
In holding that the Federal Circuit’s rigid application of the TSM test in KSR was in 
error, the Supreme Court stated that the Court’s precedent “set[s] forth an expansive and flexible 
approach [for determining obviousness that is] inconsistent with the way the [Federal Circuit] 
applied its TSM test here.”178  The Court further characterized the TSM test as a “helpful 
insight,” but cautioned that “[h]elpful insights . . . need not become rigid and mandatory 
formulas.”179  The Court then stated that “when a court transforms [a] general principle into a 
rigid rule that limits the obviousness inquiry, as the [Federal Circuit] did here, it errs.”180 
Thus, Mayo and KSR demonstrate the Federal Circuit’s commitment to advancing rigid 
frameworks and the Supreme Court’s repeated insistence that the tests proffered by the Federal 
Circuit not be dispositive on the issues of patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and 
obviousness, but rather that they occupy a small portion of the calculus towards reaching a 
workable conclusion.  The Federal Circuit’s strict adherence to the “markedly different” test, 
which it gleaned from Funk Bros. and Chakrabarty, predictably provides the Supreme Court 
with yet another chance to reject the court’s narrow analysis in favor of a much more nuanced 
and fact specific determination.  For instance, neither Funk Bros. nor Chakrabarty analyzed the 
impact of issuing a patent to the claimed invention on the public or the risk of tying up the use of 
natural laws.   
In Association for Molecular Pathology, the Federal Circuit went to great lengths to 
divorce its decision from policy considerations.  Before engaging in an analysis of whether 
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Myriad’s composition claims directed to isolated DNA were patent-eligible, the Federal Circuit 
cautioned that “it is important to state what this appeal is not about.”181  The Federal Circuit 
contended that the Association for Molecular Pathology case was “not about whether individuals 
suspected of having an increased risk of developing breast cancer are entitled to a second 
opinion.”182  Nor was the case about “whether the . . . owner of the . . . patents, or Myriad, the 
exclusive licensee . . . acted improperly in its licensing or enforcement policies with respect to 
the patents.”183  The court also contended that the appeal was not about “whether it is [sic] 
desirable for one company to hold a patent or license covering a test that may save people’s lives 
. . . .”184  But in Mayo—which the Supreme Court intended to guide the Federal Circuit’s 
decision in Association for Molecular Pathology on remand—the Court did not consider the 
issue of patent eligibility in a vacuum.  Rather, it examined the landscape of patent eligibility 
from a position that fully accounted for the policy implications of its decision, paying particular 
attention to its concern that awarding a patent may tie up the use of natural laws in an area.
185
  
This broad view of the question of subject matter eligibility was the essence of the Court’s 
holding in Mayo, and this marriage of precedent with policy is disturbingly absent from the 
Federal Circuit’s first and second Association for Molecular Pathology opinions.  
Finally, the Federal Circuit’s reliance on the statement form Chakrabarty in support of an 
extraordinarily broad scope of patent-eligible subject matter—which indicates that, “[t]he 
Committee Reports accompanying the 1952 [Patent] Act inform us that Congress intended 
statutory subject matter to ‘include anything under the sun that is made by man’”—is 
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misplaced.
186
  The full quote from the Committee Reports teaches a far more limited 
understanding of the scope of patentable subject matter.  The full quote instructs that, “[a] person 
may have ‘invented’ a machine or a manufacture, which may include anything under the sun that 
is made by man, but it is not necessarily patentable under section 101 unless the conditions of 
[this] title are fulfilled.”187  As the Supreme Court cautioned when it heard Chakrabarty, “[t]his 
[quote] is not to suggest that § 101 has no limits or that it embraces every discovery.”188 
Had the Federal Circuit not dismissed the concerns the Supreme Court expressed in Mayo 
as applicable only to method claims, and instead accounted for the implications of tying up the 
use of the natural laws in the calculus for determining patent eligibility, they would likely have 
concluded that Myriad’s claims to isolated DNA were not patent-eligible. The Federal Circuit 
would have had to look no further than to the district court’s Association for Molecular 
Pathology opinion to get a sense of the dramatic impact that awarding patents on the isolated 
DNA had among patients, researchers, and other groups.
189
 
Research has shown that gene patents have “persistent negative effects on subsequent 
scientific research.”190  The possibility of obtaining patent protection for discoveries related to 
genetic research largely does not motivate scientists to conduct research and as a result, “patents 
                                                 
186 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. REP. NO. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952); 
H.R. REP. NO. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1952). 
187 See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct 3218, 3249 (2010) (quoting S. REP. 1979, at 5; H.R. REP. 1923, at 6) (emphasis 
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covered by insurance).   
190 See id. (quoting Heidi L. Williams, Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation: Evidence from the Human 
Genome, 27 Nat’l Bureay of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16213, (2010)). 
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are not needed for much of U.S.-based genetic research to occur.”191  One of the primary 
purposes of the U.S. patent system—full disclosure of a claimed invention—is already 
accomplished by “the norms of academic science” which encourage full disclosure of research 
results in peer reviewed journals.
192
  As much as forty six percent of labs conducting genetic 
research feel that gene patents either delayed or limited their research.
193
  The exclusive rights 
conferred by gene patents do not result in faster genetic test development nor are they necessary 
for the development of genetic tests to detect rare genetic diseases.
194
  In fact, the discovery of 
the BRCA1/2 genes was made possible by substantial funding from the National Institutes of 
Health and through the use of well-known sequencing techniques by teams of scientists—some 
of whom were resolutely opposed to patenting the BRCA1/2 genes.
195
  Some researchers have 
characterized DNA patents as “difficult, if not impossible, to circumvent”196 because the patents 
often foreclose research on both the effects of the DNA sequence and the naturally occurring 
gene.
197
 
Regarding the effects of gene patents on patients seeking patented therapies, research has 
indicated that “where patents and licensing practices have created a sole-provider of a genetic 
test, patient access to those tests has suffered in a number of ways.”198  First, when a sole-
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provider of a genetic test does not accept a patient’s insurance, the cost of obtaining the test often 
proves prohibitive for large numbers of patients.
199
  Second, in situations where gene patents 
have created a sole-provider, patients are unable to obtain an independent second opinion on test 
results.
200
  It has been recognized that “[c]onfirmatory testing by another laboratory is the 
laboratory equivalent to the time-honored practice of obtaining a second opinion from a 
clinician.”201  Sole-providers of genetic tests that aggressively enforce their patents could cause 
additional access problems for patients.
202
  In one instance, patients with familial long QT 
syndrome—a life-threatening condition—were unable to receive testing for the condition  for an 
eighteen month period because the patent holder had not yet developed a commercial genetic test 
but sought to exclude others from infringing on its patent by providing a similar test.
203
  
Although scientists identified targeted cancer therapies effective in treating those with BRCA 
mutations years ago, evidence suggests that BRCA1/2 gene patents have hindered the 
availability of treatments.
204
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Finally, gene patents often have deteriorative effects on genetic test quality.
205
  A 
researcher opined that “[t]he most robust method for assuring quality in laboratory testing is 
through comparison of results obtained on samples shared between different labs.”206  
Competition among multiple laboratories offering genetic testing for the same indication often 
acts as a catalyst for improvements in test quality and for the development of more thorough 
testing techniques.
207
  Sample sharing and competition often do not occur in environments where 
a sole-provider of a genetic test prevents others from providing testing.
208
  A 2006 study of 300 
individuals who received negative test results from Myriad’s BRAC test, despite coming from 
families comprised of individuals with four or more members that had breast or ovarian cancer, 
concluded that “genetic testing does not provide all available information to women at risk . . . 
[since] 12% of those from high risk families with breast/ovarian cancer and with negative . . . 
commercial test results for [BRCA1/2] nonetheless carry cancer predisposing [mutations] in one 
of these genes.”209  The study went on to note that because of the expense and invasiveness of 
corrective procedures—such as a mastectomy—inaccurate BRCA1/2 test results coupled with a 
patient’s inability to secure a second opinion can have particularly negative consequences.210 
V. ESTABLISHING A WAY FORWARD 
On November 30, 2012, the Supreme Court elected to grant certiorari in Association for 
Molecular Pathology, following the Federal Circuit’s cursory review of the impact of Mayo on 
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the issues presented in Association for Molecular Pathology.
211
  In agreeing to hear the case, 
however, the Court chose not to review whether the Federal Circuit erred in finding Mayo and 
Association for Molecular Pathology irreconcilable, nor did the Court confine itself to 
addressing the issue of whether the petitioners lacked standing to challenge the validity of 
Myriad’s patents.212  Rather, the Court elected to review the broadest of the three questions 
raised by the petitioner, namely, “[a]re human genes patentable?”213  The fact that the question is 
before the Court suggests that the answer cannot be gleaned merely from the text of § 101.  As 
such, the process of developing an answer to the extraordinarily broad question of whether 
human genes are patentable will likely entail an extra-statutory analysis of the issues.  Happily, 
such an analysis should be fresh in the Court’s mind after its decision in Mayo—where, as 
discussed supra, the Court carefully entertained a traditional § 101 analysis while simultaneously 
stepping away from the statute to account for the policy implications of its decision—and 
concluded that the Prometheus patents were not directed to patent-eligible subject matter.   
Of particular concern to a unanimous Court in Mayo was the inhibitory effect that 
upholding the Prometheus patents would have on subsequent developments in the field of 
thiopurine administration.
214
  The Court noted that the patents “threaten[ed] to inhibit the 
development of more refined treatment recommendations . . . that combine Prometheus's 
correlations with later discovered features of metabolites, human physiology or individual patient 
characteristics.”   This concern applies with equal or greater force to Myriad’s BRCA1/2 patents 
because while the Court emphasized that Prometheus’s patents threatened to inhibit the 
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development of subsequent treatments, Myriad’s patents have already had a substantial 
preemptive effect on further genetic research, genetic test development, and patient access to 
testing.
215
 
Of course, in order to use Mayo as authority permitting an extra-statutory analysis of 
whether certain subject matter is patent-eligible, the Court must be satisfied that the 
considerations it advanced in Mayo are not limited to method claims.  Although the claims at 
issue in Mayo were directed to a method of administering thiopurines, the Court made no 
representations that the concerns it raised in Mayo were limited to the method claim context—
contrary to the Federal Circuit’s argument in Association for Molecular Pathology on remand.216  
Instead, it is likely that the Court’s reasoning in Mayo resulted from a recognition that questions 
of subject matter eligibility are often extremely complex and in some cases, a more in depth 
consideration of the varied effects of upholding patents on certain subject matter is warranted.  
The Court—relying primarily on Benson, Bilski, and AT&T, which all support the notion that 
concerns raised in the context of one type of claim are applicable in the context of another—will 
likely find Mayo is particularly applicable to the issues in Association for Molecular Pathology.  
Such a finding will enable the Court to weigh the significant policy implications of affording 
human genes patent protection—including the substantial preemptive effect such protection 
would have on future studies of patented human genes—and will lead the Court to conclude that 
human genes are not patent-eligible. 
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VI. ORAL ARGUMENT PROVIDES MORE ANALOGIES THAN ANSWERS  
 On April 13, 2013, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Association for Molecular 
Pathology.
217
  Notably, the Justices struggled to determine just how far removed from nature 
certain subject matter has to be before it can be considered patent-eligible, using analogies to 
gold made into jewelry, drugs isolated from plants in the Amazon, baseball bats carved from 
trees, and eggs, flower, and salt used to make a cookie.
218
  These analogies underscore the 
complexity of the issue before the Court. 
 Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Alito, and Kagan expressed some concern over whether 
companies like Myriad would have sufficient incentive to develop innovative new therapies 
without the possibility of securing patents on products isolated from nature.
219
  Christopher 
Hansen, arguing on behalf of the ACLU, pointed to the “enormous recognition” that companies 
and innovators would receive for their discoveries.
220
  While Justices Scalia quipped “[w]ell, 
that’s lovely” at Hanson’s rationale, Justice Kagan indicated that she hoped Hanson was going to 
point to the possibility of securing method patents or use patents on technology incorporating 
unpatentable natural products as sufficient incentive to encourage continued innovation.
221
 
 Some Justices indicated that they might be hesitant to reach the broad question of 
whether human genes constitute patent-eligible subject matter at all.  Chief Justice Roberts 
observed that the Court might be asking the wrong patent question altogether and suggested that 
perhaps the issue was one of obviousness—whether Myriad’s patents should fail because the 
method of extracting human genes would have been obvious to any trained scientist in the 
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field.
222
   Similarly, Justice Alito, expressing reservations about attempting to decide the broad 
question of when manipulating a product of nature can transform that product into an item of 
human invention, asked “why should we jump in and decide the broadest possible question?”223 
 Encouragingly, the Justices seemed not to be convinced by Gregory Castanias’s 
suggestion on behalf of Myriad that the product of nature doctrine—which excludes products of 
nature from the scope of patentable subject matter—has lost its utility in modern science.224  
Castanias argued that one of the goals of personalized medicine is to more closely replicate the 
natural actions of an individual’s body and that the product of nature doctrine, if read too 
broadly, threatens to impede progress in this developing area of medicine.
225
  Justice Kennedy 
indicated that merely isolating DNA does not impart additional utility into that segment absent 
the addition of chemicals and tags to make it a probe and only as a probe does isolated DNA 
become useful.
226
 
 Understanding that the Court’s questioning during oral argument is not always a reliable 
indication of how the Court will ultimately rule, the general tenor of the oral argument left the 
impression that the Justices may be hesitant to grant patent protection to isolated human genes.  
The Court’s decision is expected by the end of June 2013.227  
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VII. CONCLUSION 
 The Supreme Court’s Mayo opinion makes clear that when the Court considers whether 
human genes are patentable, it will take a broad view of the implications of its decision and 
ultimately weigh the well-documented effects of tying up the use of natural laws in this area into 
the calculus for determining whether this unique subject matter is patent-eligible.  The 
probability that the Court will adopt this broad approach is enhanced by the Court’s explicit 
recognition in Benson and Bilski that the analysis of subject matter eligibility should not be 
narrowly confined to comparisons between identical claim types and by the Court’s repudiation 
of the Federal Circuit’s strict adherence to inflexible standards for patent eligibility and 
obviousness in Mayo and KSR, respectively.  The Court is likely to conclude that human genes 
are not eligible for patenting, and thus, that Myriad’s claims directed to isolated BRCA1/2 DNA 
are not patent-eligible.  Declining to extend patent protection to human genes will positively 
impact genetic test quality, test development, and patient access to genetic tests.  Importantly, it 
will also provide courts with a clearer picture of the appropriate subject matter eligibility analysis 
for human genes.  This analysis undoubtedly requires courts to satisfy the threshold requirements 
set forth in section 101, but also requires courts to engage in forward-looking considerations of 
the preemptive effects of granting patent protection. 
 
 
